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The Legal Status of Employees of Private
Military/Security Companies Participating in U.N.
Peacekeeping Operations
Mohamad Ghazi Janaby

INTRODUCTION
¶1

The United Nations has hired private military/security companies (PMSCs)1 to
provide security services since at least the Somalian Civil War, when it deployed 7,000
Ghurka guards from Defense Systems Limited to protect relief convoys. 2 According to a
Global Policy Forum report, U.N. spending on outsourcing security services rose from
$44 million in 2009 to $76 million in 2010.3 PMSCs may be used in peacekeeping
operations in a variety of roles, including “police and military training and capacity
building, security training and consultancy, [and] strategic information gathering.”4 In


Mohamad Ghazi Janaby is a lecturer at the University of Babylon’s College of Law in Iraq
(law.mohammed.qazi@uobabylon.edu.iq). The author gratefully acknowledges Dr. Irene Couzigou and Dr.
Natalia Alvarez from University of Aberdeen for their valuable input. The author would like to extend his
appreciation to the editors for their insightful comments.
1 While terminology varies, this paper follows the Montreux document in defining PMSCs as private
business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe
themselves. Military and security services include, in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons
and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems;
prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel. Int’l Comm. of the Red
Cross, Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States
related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict (Sept. 17, 2008).
For more information on state practices with PMSCs, see generally Swiss Fed. Dep’t of Foreign Affairs,
The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies: Proceedings of the Regional
Workshop for North East and Central Asia, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces,
available at http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/The-Montreux-Document-on-Private-Military-and-SecurityCompanies-Proceedings-of-the-Regional-Workshop-for-North-East-and-Central-Asia. This definition is
meant to encompass what other scholars call private security companies, private military firms, the private
security industry, private contractors, private armies, privatized armies, private military corporation or
firms, private military contractors, military service providers, non-lethal service providers, corporate
security firms, and in some cases, mercenaries. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER KINSEY, CORPORATE SOLDIERS AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: T HE RISE OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES (2006); Renée De Nevers, Private
Security Companies and the Laws of War, 40 SECURITY DIALOGUE 169, 173 (2009); Todd S. Milliard,
Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private Military Companies,
176 MIL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2003). As will be made clear, it is improper to call PMSCs used in peacekeeping
operations “mercenaries.”
2 LOU P INGEOT, D ANGEROUS P ARTNERSHIP: P RIVATE M ILITARY & SECURITY COMPANIES AND THE UN 22
(2012), available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPF_Dangerous_Partnership_Full_report.pdf.
3 Id. at 23 and 45.
4 U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights [hereinafter OHCHR], Working Group
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2012, the U.N. Department of Safety and Security issued a set of formal guidelines
through which PMSCs may be hired to provide security services to the U.N.5
Nonetheless, the U.N. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, originally formed in
2005 to study “the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding
the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination,”6 warned that “there is a risk
that, without proper standards and oversight, the outsourcing of security functions by the
United Nations to private companies could have a negative effect on the image and
effectiveness of the United Nations in the field.”7
Other scholars have discussed the practical issues involved in using PMSCs in U.N.
peace operations. While some attempted to highlight the benefits of using PMSCs as part
of U.N. operations in comparison with the voluntary system of troop contribution by
U.N. Member States.8 Still others highlighted the effectiveness of these companies in
assisting with U.N. operations.9 The increased reliance by the U.N. on PMSCs has
on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right
of Peoples to Self-Determination, Summary Report of the Expert Panel on the Use of Private Military and
Security Companies by the United Nations, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. A/68/455 (July 31, 2013).
5 See U.N. Dep’t of Safety and Security, Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from Private
Security Companies (2012), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/StudyPMSC/GuidelinesOnUseOfArmedSecurit
yServices.pdf. According to these guidelines, in order for a PMSC to be hired by the U.N., it must:
a. Be a member of International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC);
b. Have been in the business of providing armed security services for at least five years;
c. Be licensed to provide security services by the state in which it is registered or incorporated;
d. Be licensed to provide security services and to carry and use firearms and ammunition by the state
in which it will operate;
e. Have started the registration process to be a registered United Nations Procurement Division
vendor; and
f. Be able to substantially comply with the scope of work.
Id. at 6.
6 OHCHR Res. 2005/2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/2, at 1 (Apr. 7, 2005). In 2008, the U.N. Human
Rights Council extended its mandate for three years and instructed it, among other things, “to monitor and
study the effects on the enjoyment of human rights, particularly the right of peoples to self-determination,
of the activities of private companies offering military assistance, consultancy and security services on the
international market and to prepare a draft of international basic principles that encourage respect for
human rights by those companies in their activities.” Human Rights Council Res. 7/21, Mandate of the
Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the
Exercise of the Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination, 7th Sess., March 28, 2008, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/RES/7/21 (Mar. 28, 2008).
7 U.N. Doc. A/68/339 (20 August 2013). See also Concept Note, Expert Panel Event on the Use of Private
Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) by the United Nations, (July 31, 2013), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/mercenaries/wg/studypmsc/expertpanelconceptnote.pdf.
8 See Oldrich Bures, Private Military Companies: A Second Best Peacekeeping Option?, 12 INT’L
PEACEKEEPING 533 (2005). See also Peter H Gantz, The Private Sector’s Role in Peacekeeping and Peace
Enforcement, REFUGEES INT’L (Nov. 18, 2003),
http://www.sandline.com/hotlinks/Refugees_InternationalC3FF13.html; PETER W. SINGER, CORPORATE
WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (2008).
9 See Ian Murphy, Private Military Companies, Peacekeeping, and African States: A Critical Analysis of
PMCs in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, (July 2010) (Ph.D. thesis, University of Plymouth). See also
James Pattison, Outsourcing the Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian Intervention and Private Military
and Security Companies, 2 INT’L THEORY 1, 2010,
http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1752971909990224; P INGEOT, supra note 2.
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encouraged some to suggest using them as front-line peacekeepers.10 However, others
question this view and argue that PMSCs cannot be hired by the U.N. as peacekeepers.11
What has received less attention, however, is the legal status of the employees of
PMSCs hired by the U.N. This paper analyzes the legal status of PMSC personnel
participating in U.N. peacekeeping. In other words, how can the personnel of private
companies be categorized when they are used as peacekeepers?
The outsourcing of military and security services used in U.N. peacekeeping
operations to PMSCs creates a gray area in international law. Under international
humanitarian law, sometimes called the law of war, peacekeepers who engage in military
operations are either civilians engaged in lawful self-defense or unlawful combatants.
Conversely, the various international conventions that govern peacekeeping and peace
enforcement operations grant peacekeepers the rights of combatants. This tension
becomes more acute when PMSCs are utilized, both when they are employed by a
Member State and seconded to the U.N., and when they are employed directly by the U.N.
itself. The secondment of PMSCs means that a State hires a PMSC and send it to the U.N.
to be under its disposal. PMSCs seconded to the U.N. would likely not qualify as
peacekeepers under the U.N.’s peacekeeping conventions, while the protections afforded
to peacekeepers (such as immunity from local prosecution) seem inappropriate regarding
PMSCs hired directly by the U.N. In particular, while PMSCs employed in peacekeeping
operations would not satisfy the technical criteria of mercenaries under the law of war, the
protections afforded to peacekeepers assume that peacekeeping forces are subject to the
domestic justice system of a Member State, which would not be the case with those
employed directly by the U.N. This tension seems ineluctable given the current structure
of international humanitarian law and U.N. peacekeeping rules.

I. THE INCREASING ROLE OF PMSCS IN U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
¶5

While PMSCs are not currently used as front-line peacekeepers, they are used in
various support capacities on peacekeeping missions. Before addressing the legal
consequences that would follow should their role evolve to include actual peacekeeping,
this paper will describe their current role and arguments in favor of giving them greater
responsibilities.
10

See Bures, supra note 8, at 540-543. See also CHRISTOPHER M. ROCHESTER, A PRIVATE ALTERNATIVE TO
(2007); Malcolm Patterson, A Corporate Alternative to
United Nations ad hoc Military Deployments, 13 J. CONFLICT SECURITY LAW 215, 221 (2008).
11 See The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, UN Use of Private Military and
Security Companies: Practices and Policies (2011) (by Åse G Østensen), available at
http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/UN-Use-of-Private-Military-and-Security-Companies-Practices-andPolicies. See also Christopher Spearin, UN Peacekeeping and the International Private Military and
Security Industry, 18 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 196, 198 (2011).
A STANDING UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE
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A. The Structure of Peacekeeping Operations in General

¶6

¶7

¶8

Peacekeeping12 is one way in which the U.N. Security Council and the
U.N. General Assembly maintain and restore international peace and security.13
Peacekeeping forces are voluntarily provided by U.N. Member States.14 When the
Security Council decides to create a peacekeeping mission, the Secretary-General of the
U.N. asks Member States to participate by seconding national troops to act as U.N.
forces. The relationship between the Member State seconding its troops and the U.N. is
governed by a formal agreement, an example of which would be the Model Agreement
between the U.N. and Member States Contributing Personnel and Equipment to United
Nations Peacekeeping Operations.15
U.N. peacekeeping forces are considered to be subsidiary organs of the U.N.16
They thus enjoy the status, privileges, and immunities set forth in Article 105 of the U.N.
Charter and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.17
Although these troops serve under the U.N. flag, they wear their
countries’ military uniform and are identified as U.N. peacekeepers only by a blue helmet
or beret and a badge.18 The main nature of U.N. peacekeeping forces is military, although
civilians and police are also part of them.19 These forces are under the command of the
Secretary-General, who has the responsibility of directing and exerting day-to-day
control over the U.N. forces and selecting force commanders.20 In addition to instructions
from U.N. force commanders, peacekeeping forces may receive orders from the heads of
their national contingents, which have the ultimate responsibility for disciplining their
forces.21
B. The Current Role of PMSCs in Peacekeeping
The majority of those who promote the participation of PMSCs in U.N. missions
highlight the inadequate coordination, training, and equipment of traditional U.N. forces
12

This paper will not address the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations
thematically, as that distinction is largely irrelevant to its primary purpose. The distinction will be noted
where relevant.
13 Marrack Goulding, The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping, 69 INT’L AFFAIRS 451, 451-452
(1993).
14 U.N. Dep’t of Peacekeeping Operations & Dep’t of Field Support, United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations Principles and Guidelines 52 (2008), available at
http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf.
15 U.N. Secretary-General, Model Agreement between the United Nations and Member States Contributing
Personnel and Equipment to United Nations Peace-Keeping Operation, U.N. Doc. A/46/185 (May 23,
1991).
16 Ray Murphy, United Nations Military Operations and International Humanitarian Law: What Rules
Apply to Peacekeepers?, 14 CRIM. L.F. 153, 159 (2003).
17 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15
(entered into force 17 September 1946).
18 U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 15; See also U.N. Secretary-General, Model Status of Force
Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations, 47(b), U.N. Doc. A/45/594 (Oct. 9, 1990).There have been 67
peacekeeping operations since 1948; as of March 31, 2013, there were 14 peacekeeping operations
throughout the world. U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet (March 31, 2013),
https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/bnote0313.pdf.
19 Jaume Saura, Lawful Peacekeeping: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations, 58 HASTINGS L. J. 479, 486 (2007).
20 Brian D. Tittemore, Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian Law to United
Nations Peace Operations 33 STAN. J. INT’L L. 61, 79 (1997).
21 Id. at 80.

85

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2015

and claim that these weaknesses can be overcome by the use of PMSCs.22 Even apart
from the calls for PMSCs, international aid organizations assert that the current U.N.
peacekeeping and peace enforcement system is weak and does not fulfill its mandated
purpose.23
¶9
One of the important reasons for the weakness of U.N. forces is the reluctance of
Western countries to second their troops to the U.N.24 At times, countries such as the
U.S. and France have refused to participate in particular U.N. missions altogether, as
happened, for example, when the U.S. declined to participate in the Liberia mission.25
Even when developed states do contribute personnel to U.N. missions, they do so to a
markedly lower degree than developing countries. In February 2014, for instance, the
U.S. had assigned only 121 troops to peacekeeping missions, Germany, 263 troops, and
the U.K., 283 troops.26
¶10
The majority of U.N. peacekeeping operations consist of troops that are not
provided with sufficient training or equipment. According to statistics provided by the
U.N. Peacekeeping Department, the majority of peacekeeping forces are provided by
developing countries. During the period mentioned above, February 2014, the
participation of troops from developing countries greatly outweighed that of developed
countries. For example, Bangladesh provided 7,929 troops, Ethiopia, 6,615, and Pakistan,
8,266.27 Most developing countries are motivated by the desire to give their troops
income and experience when sending their troops to participate in U.N. operations.28 As a
result, U.N. troops are not qualified to stop even routine violence. This is clearly
exemplified by the weakness of U.N. forces in Sierra Leone, where international forces
were unable to face the rebels.29
¶11
The U.N. consequently believes that its peacekeeping operations face serious
challenges relating to the supply of necessary troops. Ban Ki-Moon, the U.N. SecretaryGeneral, has stated that “[t]oday we face mounting difficulties in getting enough troops,
the right equipment and adequate logistical support,” and that “[s]upply has not kept
pace with demand.”30
¶12
In response to these deficiencies, various scholars hold PMSCs to be the best
alternative to classical U.N. forces. These companies are more efficient than
multinational forces in terms of organization, training, equipment, willingness, and
overall readiness.31 Others emphasize the financial aspect of PMSC participation in U.N.
operations. By some estimates, comparable missions using PMSCs could cost 10 percent
less than those currently staffed with multinational forces.32
22

See ROCHESTER, supra note 10; see also Patterson, supra note 10.
Gantz, supra note 8, at 1.
24 Pattison, supra note 9, at 2.
25 Gantz, supra note 8, at 1.
26 U.N. Dep’t of Peacekeeping Operations, Contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Feb.
28, 2014), http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2014/feb14_1.pdf.
27 Id.
28 Bures, supra note 8 at 542; see Gantz, supra note 8.
29 See Gantz, supra note 8, at 1.
30 U.N. News Centre, UN to Strengthen Peacekeeping Efforts Amid Rising Demand, Says Ban (July 7,
2009), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=31383&amp;Cr=Secretarygeneral&amp;Cr1=peacekeeping.
31 Spearin, supra note 11 at 197.
32 E.g., Ian Bruce, UN Should Pay Mercenaries to Keep Peace (Dec. 3, 2006), HERALD,
23
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The U.N. has already contracted with many PMSCs to supply services such as
advice, training, de-mining, logistics, etc.33 For example, the U.N. contracted with
Pacific Architects and Engineers to provide the U.N. missions in Haiti and Liberia with
military and security services.34 The U.N. has already hired PMSCs to provide services
concerning humanitarian assistance and relief, transport, and infrastructure
developments.35 It is suggested that there must be no difference regarding the outsourcing
of security-enforcement requirements, including peacekeeping, to PMSCs.36
¶14
Peter W. Singer suggests three situations in which PMSCs might be used in the
context of peacekeeping operations. The first involves hiring private companies to secure
relief operations. The second situation is the use of PMSCs as a “rapid reaction force”
when U.N. “blue helmets” are unable or unwilling to provide the necessary muscle to
fulfill the peacekeeping mandate. The third possibility would be to outsource the entire
peacekeeping operation to private companies. The last option in particular was
considered by the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping and the U.S. National Security
Council during the refugee crisis in what was then Zaire in 1996. 37
¶15
To sum up, it is clear that there is a considerable increase in the use of PMSCs to
provide security services to the U.N. Although the U.N. has not yet delegated
peacekeeping missions directly to PMSCs, they have been used to provide military and
security services to peacekeeping forces. Additionally, as will be elaborated later, 38 the
U.S. explicitly uses them in place of its own forces in U.N. peacekeeping operations.
Thus, an inquiry into the legal status of PMSC personnel is in order.

II. THE LEGAL STATUS OF PEACEKEEPERS
¶16

The complicated legal status of PMSCs utilized in peacekeeping operations is in
part a reflection of the complicated status of peacekeepers in general. Peacekeepers are
classified differently depending on whether one consults international humanitarian law
or the various international conventions that govern peacekeeping operations.
¶17
As a preliminary matter, one might contest whether international humanitarian law
is applicable to the U.N. at all. This question was confronted to some extent during early
U.N. operations, such as in Korea.39 The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
http://platform.blogs.com/passionofthepresent/2006/12/un_should_pay_m.html.
33 Østensen, supra note 11, at 11.
34 FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH O FFICE, P RIVATE M ILITARY COMPANIES: OPTIONS FOR REGULATION,
2001-2, H.C. 557, at 19 (U.K.).
35 Kevin A. O'Brien, Military-Advisory Groups and African Security: Privatized Peacekeeping?, 5 INT’L
PEACEKEEPING 78, 99 (1998).
36 Id.
37 Peter W. Singer, Peacekeepers, Inc., P OLICY REVIEW (June 2003), available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/pmscs/51272-peacekeeping-inc-.html?itemid=id.
38 Infra Part IV.B.
39 Christopher Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations, 1
Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN LAW 3 (1998); Walter G. Sharp, Protecting the Avatars of International
Peace and Security, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 93 (1996); Umesh Palwankar, Applicability of
International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace-keeping Forces, 33 I.R.R.C. 227 (1993); Torsten
S. Saarbrücken, Arts 36-38, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 694 (Bruno
Simma et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2002); R. SIMMONDS, LEGAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE UNITED NATIONS
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO 168 (1968).
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has considered the U.N. to be “a subject of international law and capable of possessing
international rights and duties.”40 This refers to all the rules of international law,
including international humanitarian law.41 Respect for international humanitarian law by
U.N. forces is also mandated by the status of forces agreements entered into between the
U.N. and the State receiving a peacekeeping mission.42 Both the Secretary-General’s
Bulletin on Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law43
and the Report of the Panel on the U.N. Peace Operations44 declare that international
humanitarian law applies to U.N. forces.
¶18
Aside from some technicalities,45 the main argument against applying international
humanitarian law to U.N. peacekeeping forces stems from the fact that the U.N. does not
have any criminal justice system; thus, it cannot fulfill the obligations of a state to
prosecute those of its armed forces who commit violations of international humanitarian
law.46 Members of U.N. peacekeeping forces have committed considerable violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law, including torture, sexual violence, and
attacks on civilians in Somalia, Congo, Haiti, Mozambique, East Timor, Bosnia, Kosovo,
and Cambodia.47
¶19
Yet this is not a problem when U.N. missions comprise traditional, multinational
forces seconded by Member States—such violations can still be prosecuted by the
contributing states.48 Indeed, states have a duty to ensure that they respect the 1949
Geneva Conventions, according to Common Article 1, and this responsibility continues

40

Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 117.
Greenwood, supra note 39, at 17.
42 See, e.g., Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, Nov. 5, 1993,
1748 U.N.T.S. 257 (the U.N. “shall conduct its operations in Rwanda with full respect for the principles
and spirit of the general convention, applicable to the conduct of military personnel. These international
conventions include the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocol of 8
June 1977.”). See also The Status of Forces Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government
of the Republic of South Sudan Concerning the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (SOFA), (adopted
Aug. 8, 2011).
43 UN Secretary-General, Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, U.N.
Doc ST/ SGB/ 1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999). The Bulletin has been described as binding norms on U.N.
personnel because of its nature as U.N. “internal law” and the obligations of U.N. stemming from
customary international law. See Saura, supra note 19, at 497.
44 Rep. of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, U.N. Doc A/55/305; GAOR 55th Sess. (2000).
45 See 31st Round Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law, Sanremo, Sept. 4-6,
2008, The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Peace Operations, from Rejection to
Acceptance, at 91 (by Daphna Shraga).
46 Greenwood, supra note 39, at 15.
47 See Peter F. Chapman, Ensuring Respect: United Nations Compliance with International Humanitarian
Law, HUMAN R IGHTS BRIEF 17, no. 1, 3-11 (2009), http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/17/1chapman.pdf.
See also U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal
Oversight Services, 59th Session, U.N. Doc A/59/661 (2005); UNIFEM, Women, War and Peace: The
Independent Experts’ Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peace
Building (2002) (by Elisabeth Rehn & Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf,); Sex and the UN: when Peacemakers
Become Predators, THE INDEPENDENT (Jan. 11, 2005),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/sex-and-the-un-when-peacemakers-become-predators6155183.html; Int’l Peace Research Inst., Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers, Policy Brief
10/2009 (2009) (by Suk Chun).
48 Saarbrücken, supra note 39, at 695.
41

88

Vol. 13:1]

Mohamad Ghazi Janaby

even if they second their forces to the U.N.49 A member of peacekeeping forces would
be, therefore, prosecuted before the courts of his state if he commits a violation of
international humanitarian law.50 As a result, there is no problem in applying
international humanitarian law in determining the legal status of traditional U.N.
peacekeepers.
A. Peacekeepers Under International Humanitarian Law
¶20

International humanitarian law provides a classification for all persons on the
battlefield. Individuals in combat environments are either civilians or combatants.
According to Article 50 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (AP I), a
civilian is a person who belongs neither to the category of prisoners of war nor that of a
member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict.51 Based on this definition,
international humanitarian law may classify peacekeepers as civilians.52
¶21
The status of peacekeepers as civilians under international humanitarian law carries
with it certain protections. The prohibition against “feigning . . . protected status by the
use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or other states not
parties to the conflict”53 represents one kind of that protection.54 In addition, the parties to
an international armed conflict have a duty to respect and protect peacekeepers engaged
in relief operations.55 In general, peacekeepers are civilians who deserve protection
afforded by Articles 48, 50, 51, and 52 of the AP I. This means that any attack on them
would be unlawful, and they would have to be granted the fundamental guarantees
provided in Article 75 of the AP I if captured.56 Peacekeepers would also be protected in
the context of non-international armed conflicts. Under Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, they would be regarded as “persons taking no active part in hostilities.”
Such a status would make any attack on them illegal.57
¶22
The status of peacekeepers as protected civilians may be regarded as a rule of
customary international law. For example, Rule 33 of the Customary International
Humanitarian Law Database prohibits attacking “personnel and objects involved in a
peace-keeping mission . . . as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians
and civilian objects under international humanitarian law[.]”58 The military manuals of
many States also regard peacekeepers as civilians, such as those of the Netherlands59 and
49

Greenwood, supra note 39, at 17.
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 397 (2004).
51 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 50, adopted 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 609 (entered into
force Dec. 7,1978) [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
52 Alice Gadler, The Protection of Peacekeepers and International Criminal Law: Legal Challenges and
Broader Protection, 11 GERMAN L.J. 585, 589 (2010).
53 Additional Protocol I, supra note 51, at art. 37(1)(d).
54 Greenwood, supra note 39, at 30.
55 Id. at 31; See also Additional Protocol I, supra note 51, at arts. 69-71.
56 Greenwood, supra note 39, at 31.
57 Id.
58 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [hereinafter ICRC], Customary IHL - Rule 33. Personnel and Objects
Involved in a Peacekeeping Mission (2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule33.
59 ICRC, Customary IHL - Practice Relating to Rule 33. Personnel and Objects Involved in a Peacekeeping
50
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the U.K.60 Attacks against peacekeeping forces are crimes under legislation passed in the
U.K.,61 the Netherlands,62 and Iraq.63
¶23
In general, U.N. Member States do not readily accept categorizing members of
their armed forces assigned to U.N. missions as combatants,64 since this would make their
personnel legitimate military targets. 65 For example, NATO Member States insisted that
their pilots who bombed Bosnian Serb positions were U.N. experts, not combatants.66
This would mean that these experts had the right to attack Bosnian Serbs, while the latter
did not have the right to return fire.67 Going by this logic regarding the status of the
pilots, retaliation on the part of the Bosnian Serb would in fact constitute an international
crime under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.68
Perhaps unsurprisingly, however, France changed its position when two of its pilots were
shot down by Bosnian Serb forces, claiming that they should be given the protections of
prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention, a status not afforded to civilians.69
¶24
Civilian status is a two-sided coin under international humanitarian law. On one
hand, civilians are protected from attacks during armed conflict. On the other, they are
obligated not to directly participate in hostilities. Thus, treating peacekeepers as civilians
entails an obligation not to directly participate in hostilities; otherwise they lose their
protected status.70 However, this rule of international humanitarian law is in tension with
the rules crafted specially for peacekeeping operations, as will be highlighted next.
B. Peacekeepers Under U.N. Documents
¶25

As mentioned foregoing, there is debate on the applicability of international
humanitarian law to U.N. peacekeeping forces when they are engaged in armed
conflicts.71 However, it is not clear whether international humanitarian law’s definitions
of civilian and combatant are applicable to peacekeeping forces. In other words, while
international humanitarian law is specific in categorizing persons on the battlefield as
civilians or combatants, various U.N. documents suggest a different categorization for
peacekeepers. Thus, it is an open question whether international humanitarian law assigns
the appropriate status concerning peacekeepers and PMSC personnel in peacekeeping
Mission (2005), available at https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule33.
60 M INISTRY OF DEFENCE, T HE JOINT DOCTRINE & CONCEPTS CENTRE, JSP 383: T HE JOINT SERVICE
MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 14, 377-82 (2004), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27874/JSP3832004Edition.p
df.
61 U.N. Personnel Act, 1997, c. 13, art. 1 (U.K.).
62 International Crimes Act, Stb. 2003, p. 230, art. 5(5) (Neth.).
63 Iraqi High Criminal Court Law of 2005, art. 13(2)(C), 13(4)(C) (Iraq).
64 Some try to classify U.N. forces as combatants due to their uniform, weapons, and driving in around
personnel carriers. See 31st Round Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law,
Sanremo, Sept. 4-6, 2008, International Humanitarian Law and Peace Operations, Scope of Application
Ratione Materiae, at 100-06 (by Marco Sassoli).
65 Id. at 105.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Additional protocol I, supra note 51, at art. 51.
71 Greenwood, supra note 39; see also Sharp, supra note 39; Palwankar, supra note 39.
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operations. This part of the paper will now investigate peacekeeping rules established by
the U.N. in order to compare them with the provisions of international humanitarian law.
Two key U.N. documents concerning the legal status of peacekeepers are the
Convention on Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and the SecretaryGeneral’s Bulletin. The Convention establishes that those who take part in U.N. peace
enforcement operations in accordance with Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter are
combatants.72 Similarly, the Bulletin provides that members of both peace enforcement
and peacekeeping operations are combatants when actively engaged in armed conflict. 73
The Bulletin classifies peacekeepers as combatants only when they directly participate in
hostilities, whereas members of peace enforcement operations are classified as
combatants even if they do not participate in hostilities.74 Thus, the distinction between
civilian and combatant status for the members of U.N. peacekeeping forces hinges on
their active engagement in armed conflict.
Peacekeepers can actively engage in armed conflict in two situations. The first is
personal self-defense, the second, defense of the mandate.
Refraining from the use of force except in self-defense is one of the core principles
of peacekeeping. The rules of engagement for every peacekeeping mission expressly state
that the use of force is allowed only in self-defense.75
The permission to use force in self-defense has been stretched, however, to include
the use of force to defend the mandate.76 Self-defense, in this view, is interpreted broadly
to include defense of others, and thus covers such third parties as civilians, convoys of
humanitarian assistance,77 and safe areas.78
As a result of this expanded conception of self-defense, peacekeeping forces have
been deployed to many conflict areas where there were no operational cease-fires. For
example, the mandate of the U.N. Mission in the Congo (ONUC) permitted the use of
force, albeit as a last resort, to prevent civil war by arranging for a cease-fire, bringing all
military operations to a halt, and preventing clashes.79 The U.N. Security Council’s
authorizing ONUC to use force was controversial, raising questions about whether the
72

Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel art. 2, ¶2, adopted Dec. 9, 1994,
2051 U.N.T.S. 363. While most peacekeeping operations are established by U.N. Security Council mandate
under Chapter VI of the Charter, increasing use has been made of the provisions in Chapter VII, especially
when a recipient state is unable to maintain security and order. TREVOR FINDLAY, THE USE OF FORCE IN UN
PEACE OPERATIONS (SIPRI ed., 1st ed. 2002).
73 UN Secretary-General, supra note 43.
74 Id.
75 Katherine E. Cox, Beyond Self-Defense: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations & the Use of Force,
27 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 239, 249 (1999).
76 Yasushi Akashi, The Use of Force in a United Nations Peace-Keeping Operation: Lessons Learnt from
the Safe Areas Mandate, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 312, 320 (1995); Accord Ray Murphy, United Nations
Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia, and The Use of Force, 8 J. CONFLICT SECURITY LAW 71 (2003).
77 For example, see the mandates concerning some U.N. missions: United Nations Operation in Somalia I
(UNOSOM I), S.C. Res. 751, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (Apr. 24, 1992); United Nations Protection Force in
Croatia (UNPROFOR), S.C. Res. 743, U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (Feb. 21, 1992); United Nations Assistance
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), S.C. Res. 872, U.N. Doc. S/RES/872 (Oct. 5, 1993).
78 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 836, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (June 4, 1993) (instructing multinational forces to secure
six safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina); S.C. Res. 918, U.N. Doc S/RES/918 (May 7, 1994) (instructing
U.N. forces in Rwanda to, among others things, “take action in self-defense against persons or groups who
threaten protected sites and populations.”).
79 See, e.g., S.C. Res 4741, U.N. Doc S/RES/4741 (February 21, 1961).
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mission was peacekeeping or was instead the sort of peace enforcement operation
traditionally authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.80 The ICJ stated,
however, that the ONUC mandate’s use-of-force provisions did not make it a peace
enforcement measure.81 Similarly, the reinforced U.N. mission in Sierra Leone
represented a considerable turn toward what is called “robust peacekeeping.”82
This mission started in 1998 with 70 observers.83 When armed groups breached the peace
agreement, the Security Council decided to deploy over 11,000 troops authorized to use
force both to defend its mandate and to protect civilians.84 The majority of U.N.
peacekeeping missions since 2000 have included similar provisions.85 The U.N. Task
Force in Somalia, established according to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, was
authorized to use all necessary means to create a secure environment for
humanitarian operations.86
¶31
The content of these mandates makes it impossible to reconcile the status of
peacekeepers under U.N. rules to the status accorded them under international
humanitarian law. Under international humanitarian law, they are protected as civilians
and consequently do not have the right to take participate in hostilities. Yet under
peacekeeping rules, they are civilians who become combatants if they are actively
engaged in armed conflict. Under international humanitarian law, self-defense does not
constitute direct participation in hostilities and so does not result in losing the protected
status of a civilian.87 Under peacekeeping rules, however, self-defense does transform
peacekeepers from civilians into combatants. Finally, the main criterion for determining
peacekeepers’ combatant status under peacekeeping rules is a “direct participation in
hostilities,” while such a criterion is not decisive under international humanitarian law. 88
80

DAVID W. BOWETT, UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE 176
(1964). See also Cox, supra note 75, at 252.
81 The ICJ stated
It is not necessary for the Court to express an opinion as to which article or articles of the
Charter were the basis for the resolutions of the Security Council, but it can be said that
the operations of ONUC did not include a use of armed force against a State which the
Security Council, under Article 39, determined to have committed an act of aggression or
to have breached the peace. The armed forces which were utilized in the Congo were not
authorized to take military action against any State. The operation did not involve
“preventive or enforcement measures” against any State under Chapter VI1 and therefore
did not constitute “action” as that term is used in Article II.
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 177.
82 31st Round Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law, Sanremo, Sept. 4-6 2008,
The Evolution of Peace Operations, from Interposition to Integrated Missions (by Corinna Kuhl).
83 S.C. Res 1181, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1181 (July 13, 1998).
84 S.C. Res 1289, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1289, (Feb. 7, 2000).
85 Kuhl, supra note 82.
86 S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992).
87 N ILS MELZER, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF D IRECT P ARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 61 (2009).
88 Additional Protocol I, supra note 51, at art. 43; Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War art. 4, adopted 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III].
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III. LEGAL STATUS OF EMPLOYEES OF PMSCS

From the foregoing, it is clear that there is a difference between rules of
international humanitarian law and peacekeeping in relation to the status of peacekeepers.
Such differences may lead to even more ambiguity when PMSCs are used as
peacekeepers. Generally speaking, PMSC personnel not directly participating in
hostilities qualify as civilians.89 This part will flesh out how this status would be affected
if they became involved in peacekeeping operations. Ultimately, the status of PMSC
personnel may depend on the manner of their involvement in peacekeeping, that is, upon
whether they are hired by a Member State and seconded to the U.N. or instead hired
directly by the U.N.
A. Applicability of Mercenary Status
¶33

As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to address the belief that PMSCs are
nothing more than modern-day mercenaries.90 At a minimum, however, this view cannot
be applied to PMSCs hired for use in U.N. peacekeeping operation. This is due to the
narrowness of the internationally accepted definition of a “mercenary” as evidenced by
both Article 47 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (AP I)
and the U.N. Convention against Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries (U.N. Mercenary Convention).
¶34
Article 47 of AP I defines a mercenary in terms of six criteria, all of which must be
met before a person can be classified as a mercenary. Such a person must: 1) be recruited
locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; 2) actually take part directly in the
hostilities; 3) be motivated essentially by the desire for private gain and in fact be
promised material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to
combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of the party to the conflict
by or on behalf of which that promise is made; 4) be neither a national of a party to the
conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict; 5) not be a
member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and 6) have not been sent by a state
which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces. 91 The
89

See Won Kidane, The Status of Private Military Contractors under International Humanitarian Law,
38 DEN. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 361, 390-99 (2010); Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct
Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L., 511, 523-31
(2004); J. Ricou Heaton, Civilians at War: Reexamining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the Armed
Forces 57 A.F. L. REV. 155, 174 (2005).
90 See, e.g., Peter W Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and
International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L LAW 521, 532 (2004) (arguing that international law does
not cover private military forces, and as a result they cannot be considered mercenaries under international
law.); de Nevers, supra note 1, at 174, n. 6 (citing SINGER, supra note 8, at 44-48); SARAH PERCY,
REGULATING THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY 14 (2006); Sarah Percy, Morality and Regulation, in FROM
MERCENARIES TO MARKET: T HE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 11-14 (Simon
Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds.,
2007); Doug Brooks, In Search of Adequate Legal and Regulatory Frameworks, 2 J. INT’L PEACE
OPERATIONS 4 (2007); Simon Chesterman, Leashing the Dogs of War, 5 CARNEGIE REPORTER 37-45
(2008)) (compiling sources to show that “[m]any observers have argued that [Private Security Companies]
closely resemble mercenaries . . . .”); Zoe Salzman, Private Military Contractors and the Taint of a
Mercenaries Reputation, 40 INT’L L. & POL. 853, 874 (2008) (“While private contractors seem, in many
respects, to have succeeded in ‘repackaging’ themselves as distinct from mercenaries, it is less clear that
they are actually any different.”) (emphasis in original).
91 Additional Protocol I, supra note 51, at art. 47.
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U.N. Mercenary Convention expands these criteria to require that a mercenary be
“ . . . [r]ecruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a concerted act of
violence aimed at: . . . [o]verthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the
constitutional order of a State; or . . . [u]ndermining the territorial integrity of a State.”92
¶35
There are clearly provisions that cannot be applied to employees of PMSCs hired
by the U.N. For example, when PMSCs are hired by the U.N., they cannot be said to be
hired by a party to the conflict or to have been asked to take part in the conflict. As
discussed, peacekeepers are not sent to participate in an armed conflict. A combatant
must take direct part in hostilities in order to qualify as a mercenary, moreover. Yet what
constitutes “direct participation in hostilities” lacks any internationally accepted
definition, and cannot be applied to parties hired directly by the U.N. to take part in
peacekeeping in any event: far from directly participating in hostilities, peacekeepers are
not permitted to use force except in self-defense. Therefore, employees of PMSCs taking
part in U.N. peacekeeping operations cannot be categorized as mercenaries under
international law.
B. PMSCs Seconded to the U.N. by Member States
The U.N. does not have a standing army or a police force. 93 As such, U.N. missions
are composed of armed forces seconded by Member States based on Security Council
request. There is no obligation on Member States to respond to such requests, let alone to
provide armed contingents of a specific number or kind. A Member State has the freedom
to choose which kind of armed forces it can provide.
¶37
A state may decide to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations by contracting
with PMSCs either to represent its armed forces or to support a mission. The latter option
is frequently employed by the U.S., for example. After the decision not to
second federal police forces to international missions, the U.S. State Department hired
PMSCs to provide police services to international peacekeeping operations. 94 It has been
suggested that, prior to 2004, “every US police officer taking part in U.N. Civilian
Police . . . was in fact a DynCorp employee,” referring to DynCorp International, a
private U.S. company.95 In 2003, the same company contracted with the State
Department to perform services required for peacekeeping in Africa.96 During the 2004
U.N. peacekeeping mission in Haiti, the State Department contracted with PAE
Government Services, Inc., and the Homeland Security Corporation to support and
¶36

92

International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, art. 1,
Dec. 4, 1989, 2163 U.N.T.S. 98.
93 There was an attempt to create the U.N. standing army based on Denmark’s proposal to institute the U.N.
Standing High-Readiness Brigade. This Brigade would be used for peacekeeping missions according to the
U.N. Charter. These forces were created in 2000 under the name “Multinational United Nations Standby
Forces High-Readiness Brigade.” Many States participated in this Brigade such as Austria, Canada,
Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Sweden. These forces were sent as peacekeepers to many
countries such as Ethiopia & Eritrea, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sudan. The Brigade was disbanded in
2009. For more information, see UNTERM, Multinational United Nations Standby Forces High-Readiness
Brigade (Apr. 3 2014), available at http://unterm.un.org/DGAACS/unterm.nsf; Murphy, supra note 9, at
287.
94 Østensen, supra note 11, at 12-13.
95Id. at 12.
96 Id. at 13.
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maintain the U.S. Civilian Police contribution to that mission.97 The question, therefore,
is whether such use of private companies in peacekeeping changes the status of their
employees as civilians. That is, would they be regarded as combatants belonging to the
national armed forces of the seconding state?
To answer this question, it must first be noted that a state may second private
companies to participate in peacekeeping operations if these companies are incorporated
into its national armed forces. For such companies to be regarded as part of national
armed forces, however, a number of legal requirements, established by international
humanitarian law, must be fulfilled. A private company may be incorporated into the
armed forces of a nation either on a de facto or de jure basis, in accordance with Article 4
of the Third Geneva Convention and Article 43 of AP I.98
A de facto incorporation into a nation’s armed forces can occur where a private
company is treated as a “group” or “unit” in accordance with Article 43. This requires,
inter alia, that the PMSC be subject to internal disciplinary controls that enforce
compliance with the rules of international law applicable to armed conflict.99
Treating a PMSC as a de facto representative of a state in U.N. peacekeeping
operations is problematic, however. As adopted in the Third Geneva Convention, the de
facto relationship is applicable only to international armed conflicts: under Article 43 of
AP I and Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, a de facto relationship arises only
when an armed group carries out combat functions to support one of the parties to an
international armed conflict.100 At the same time, only states and national movements
may be parties to an international armed conflict.101 The second article of each of the four
Geneva conventions limits their applicability to “all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties.”
Yet as been noted repeatedly in this paper, peacekeepers are not sent to take part in an
armed conflict. One of the most important principles of peacekeeping operations is that
the use of force is prohibited except in cases of self-defense and defense of the mandate.
Therefore, peacekeeping operations do not qualify as armed conflicts within the meaning
of Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. Moreover, the de facto relationship
can arise only between an armed group and a party to the international armed conflict,
i.e., either a state or a national movement. In peacekeeping, by contrast, a PMSC is
seconded by a state to the U.N., which means that the relevant relationship is between a
seconding state and an international organization. It is clear that this relationship does
not satisfy what is required under international humanitarian law for it to be labeled as a
de facto relationship.
An additional problem arises from the fact that Article 4(A) (2) requires that such
an armed group “belong to a party to the conflict.” This expression is interpreted to mean
97

PAE-HSC Joint Venture Partnership Civilian Peacekeeping Missions Overseas, 14, Aug. 4, 2004,
Contract No (S-LMAQM-04-C-0033), available at
http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/industry_initiatives/contracts/dos_contract_pae-hsc_peacekeeping_slmaqm-04-c-0033_scope-of-work.pdf.
98 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Business Goes to War: Private Military/Security Companies and International
Humanitarian Law, 88 I.R.R.C. 55 (2006); HANNAH TONKIN, STATE CONTROL OVER PRIVATE MILITARY
AND SECURITY COMPANIES IN ARMED CONFLICT 85-86 (2011).
99 Additional Protocol I, supra note 51, at art. 43.
100 T ONKIN, supra note 98, at 86.
101 Additional Protocol I, supra note 51, at art. 1.
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that there must be some kind of link between an irregular armed group and a state. 102 The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, for example, held that this
link requires a state to exercise overall control over these groups.103 The peacekeeping
contingent, by contrast, is regarded as a subsidiary organ of the U.N., which means that it
would be under the command and control of that organization.104 Because the seconding
state does not exercise command and control over a PMSC that
accompanies its forces in a peacekeeping operation, that PMSC has not been incorporated
into that state’s national armed forces on a de facto basis, as defined by international
humanitarian law.
¶42
Alternatively, there might be a de jure relationship between a PMSC and a state.
Such a relationship comes about by the issuance of a domestic decree, statute, etc. that
incorporates the PMSC into the national armed forces.105 A contract between a state and a
PMSC is not enough to transform the PMSC’s staff into members of the national armed
forces: there must be a more formal affiliation.106 There are very few examples of such
incorporation. The staff of a South African company, Executive Outcomes, was
incorporated into the armed forces of Sierra Leone during the civil war in 1995-96, and
the personnel of a U.K. company, Sandline, were incorporated into the Papua New
Guinea national armed forces as “special constables” in 1997.107
¶43
This kind of de jure relationship is sanctioned by Article 4(A)(1) of the Third
Geneva Convention. Under that article, prisoners of war can include ‘‘members of the
armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps
forming part of such armed forces.”108 By the terms of the article, the only criterion for a
volunteer corps is that they “form . . . [a] part” of the armed forces. There is no specific
and clear guidance, however, that can be used to determine whether a member of an
armed group can be considered to be a member of the armed forces.109 Article 4(A)(1)
sets out no requirements that a militia or volunteer corps must meet in order to be
considered as “forming part” of the armed forces.110 Since international humanitarian law
does not provide any guidance in this regard, any such requirements would have to be
supplied by domestic law, which determines the structure and size of a state’s armed
102

Hin-Yan Liu, Leasing the Corporate Dogs of War: The Legal Implications of the Modern Private
Military Companies, 15 J. CONFLICT SECURITY LAW 141, 154 (2010).
103 The Prosecutor v Duˇsko Tadic (Judgment in Sentencing Appeals) (July 15, 1999), IT-94-1-A.
104 Matija Kovac, Legal Issues Arising from the Possible Inclusion of Private Military Companies in UN,
2009, 13 MAX P LANCK Y.B. OF U.N. LAW 307, 322. A national contingent’s chain of command runs from
the Security Council to the Secretary-General to the U.N. commander-in-chief, the last of which — a highranking officer — is appointed by the Secretary-General from among a state’s national forces. The chain of
command then continues down to include national commanders of national contingents who are under the
command of the U.N., as specified by agreements with the participating states. See LINDSEY CAMERON &
VINCENT CHETAIL, PRIVATIZING W AR: PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES UNDER PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (2013).
105 Lindsey Cameron, Private Military Companies: Their Status under International Humanitarian Law
and its Impact on their Regulation, 88 I.R.R.C. 573, 582 (2006); TONKIN, supra note 98, at 85.
106 Gillard, supra note 98, at 533.
107 T ONKIN, supra note 98, at 85; Juan C. Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private
International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder, 34 STAN. J. INT’L LAW
75, 124 (1998).
108 Geneva Convention III, supra note 88, at art. 4(A)(1).
109 Gillard, supra note 98.
110 Id. at 532.
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forces.111 That is, the validity of a PMSC’s incorporation into the state’s armed forces
sufficient to satisfy Article 4(A)(1) is determined solely by that state’s domestic law. The
rules governing the de jure relationship are more applicable to PMSCs participating in
U.N. peacekeeping operations. If a state incorporated a PMSC into its armed forces, then
the latter can represent a state concerned in U.N. peacekeeping operations. In that case,
the PMSC would be dealt with as an agent of the state. Personnel of a private company
seconded to U.N. peacekeeping missions would be regarded as combatants pursuant to
the rules of international humanitarian law. Under the U.N. Secretary-General’s Bulletin,
however, they would be considered civilians if they did not participate in armed conflict
directly and combatants if they did.112 It does not seem that there would be a special legal
issue in this regard, since personnel of a private company would be regarded as members
of the armed forces of a state.
C. PMSCs Hired Directly by the U.N.
¶44

The U.N. has relied upon PMSCs in various peacekeeping missions. Hiring PMSCs
to carry out peacekeeping functions instead of relying on traditional U.N. forces was
suggested for the first time in 1996 during the Rwandan Genocide. In light of the failure of
U.N. forces to protect civilians, the U.N. High Commission for Refugees suggested that
PMSCs be relied upon to separate belligerents from civilians in the Goma camps.113 In
response to this suggestion, an offer was made by Executive Outcomes to create “security
islands” by deploying 1500 of their personnel over a period of fourteen days — at a cost of
$150 million. The U.N. rejected this offer due to a lack of agreement as to who should pay,
and Member States subsequently offered to provide personnel to participate in the
operation. The weaknesses and considerable costs of the U.N. operations in Rwanda when
compared with the offer made by Executive Outcomes have led some to support the use of
PMSCs. 114 Since the Security Council has the power to delegate the conduct of peace
operation to regional organizations such as NATO, 115 the European Union,116 and the
African Union,117 Cameron and Chetail argued that it may also delegate this task to
PMSCs.118
111

CHRISTIAN SCHALLER, PRIVATE SECURITY AND MILITARY COMPANIES UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT, IN PRIVATE M ILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES: CHANCES, PROBLEMS, PITFALLS
AND PROSPECTS 345 (Thomas Jäger & Gerhard Kümmel eds., 2007); Louise Doswald-Beck, Private
Military Companies under International Humanitarian Law, in FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET: T HE
RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds.,
2007).
112 UN Secretary-General, supra note 43.
113 Int’l Alert, Humanitarian Action and Private Security Companies (2002) at 11 (by Tony Vaux et al.),
available at http://www.patronusanalytical.com/page12/assets/HUMANACT.pdf.
114 S INGER, supra note 8, at 185.
115 See, e.g., UNPROFOR, supra note 77; The Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(IFOR/SFOR), S.C. Res. 1088, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1088 (Dec. 12, 1996); and The Kosovo Force in the
Balkans (KFOR), S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (Jun. 10, 1999).
116 See, e.g., The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), S.C.
Res 1778, U.N. Doc S/RES/1373 (25 Sept. 2007).
117 See, e.g.,The African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation (UNAMID), S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc
S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007).
118 CAMERON & CHETAIL, supra note 104, at 29.

97

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2015

¶45

The question here is not whether the Security Council or General Assembly has the
legal competence to delegate the conduct of peacekeeping mission to PMSCs.119 It is
rather about the status of personnel of PMSCs contracted directly by the U.N. to perform
peacekeeping operations.
¶46
A PMSC used in peacekeeping may be regarded as an “agent” of the U.N.
According to the ICJ in its advisory opinion in Reparation for injuries suffered in the
service of the United Nations, the term “agent” can be used to refer to those who are
used by the U.N. to carry out its functions. It stated that:
The Court understands the word “agent” in the most liberal sense,
that is to say, any person who, whether a paid official or not, and
whether permanently employed or not, has been charged by an
organ of the organization with carrying out, or helping to carry out,
one of its functions—in short, any person through whom it acts.120
¶47 Similarly, in its advisory opinion on the Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the ICJ stated that
“[i]n practice, according to the information supplied by the Secretary-General, the United
Nations has had occasion to entrust missions — increasingly varied in nature — to
persons not having the status of United Nations officials.”121 In the commentary on the
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations, the U.N. International
Law Commission is explicit that the term “agent” does not refer only to ”officials but
also to other persons acting for the United Nations on the basis of functions conferred by
an organ of the organisation.”122 By these interpretations of what an “agent” is, a private
company hired directly by the U.N. to participate in peacekeeping operations can be
classified as an agent of the U.N. This would mean that the PMSC’s personnel would
assume the legal status of peacekeepers. In other words, they would be civilians and have
the privileges and immunities of U.N. personnel if not actively involved in armed
conflict. They would also be considered combatants if they took direct part in hostilities.
D. Implications of the Legal Status of PMSC Peacekeepers Hired By the United Nations
¶48

The conclusion that PMSC personnel hired by the U.N. to serve as peacekeepers
would be civilians until they participated directly in hostilities, in which case they would
be combatants, generates some legal issues worth considering. The majority of jurists
believe that the personnel of PMSCs are civilians under the rules of international
humanitarian law.123 And so long as PMSC personnel used in peacekeeping
119
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100, ¶ 66.
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2011).
123 See, e.g., Won Kidane, supra note 89; Schmitt, supra note 89; Heaton, supra note 89; Cameron, supra
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did not take part in hostilities directly, they would continue to enjoy that status. If they
were to take part in hostilities, however, they would have to lose their protected status as
civilians and be considered unlawful combatants.124 Under the peacekeeping rules formed
by various U.N. conventions and standard Status of Forces Agreements, however, the
personnel of PMSCs used in peacekeeping would not face any of these consequences if
they became actively involved in armed conflict: they would instead be regarded as
combatants.125 That is, there is a tension between international humanitarian law on one
hand and the patchwork of rules specific to peacekeeping on the other in this regard.
¶49
It should be noted that the criterion for a peacekeeper’s status as a combatant is
“direct participation in hostilities,” a criterion foreign to international humanitarian law.
Combatant status under Article 43(2) of AP I and Article 4(A) of the Third Geneva
Convention is determined by membership in the armed forces (other than medical
personnel and chaplains) and membership in militias or volunteer corps forming part of
such armed forces. The rights of combatants are conferred on members of organized
armed groups that are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, have a
fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry arms openly, and respect the laws
and customs of war.126 Everyone else has the rights and protections of a civilian.127 Direct
participation in hostilities is irrelevant to combatant or civilian status. A member of the
armed forces is a combatant even if he or she does not take direct part in hostilities. For
example, the Appeal Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia is clear that “members of the armed forces resting in their homes in the area
of the conflict . . . remain combatants whether or not they are in combat or for the time
being armed.”128
¶50
Consequently, classifying PMSC personnel as combatants depending on their direct
participation in hostilities would be a departure from the rules of international
humanitarian law relating to the definition of combatants. One must certainly wonder
why the staff of private companies would be unlawful combatants when hired by states to
take direct part in hostilities, yet be lawful combatants if they actively engage in armed
conflicts as U.N.-hired peacekeepers. Such individuals are not members of a national
army, after all, but are instead private citizens working for private firms.129
¶51
The only possible way for PMSC personnel to gain the status of combatants under
international humanitarian law is through de facto or de jure association with a state’s
armed forces, as discussed above, yet neither of these routes is possible when the PMSC
is hired by the U.N. The de jure route requires enacting a law incorporating a PMSC into
the national armed forces. Yet the U.N. has neither its own armed forces nor a legal
system analogous to those of States. The de facto route is based upon a relationship
between a PMSC and a party to the armed conflict. Yet the PMSC’s employer — the
U.N. — is not a party to an armed conflict in peacekeeping operations.
note 105.
124 Additional Protocol I, supra note 51, at art. 51(3).
125 U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 43 at 1.
126 Additional Protocol I, supra note 51, at art. 43(2). See also Geneva Convention III, supra note 88, at art.
4(A).
127 Additional Protocol I, supra note 51, at art. 50.
128 Kordić and Čerkez (Judgement) (2004) IT-95-14/2-A at ¶ 51.
129 S INGER, supra note 8, at 169.
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¶52

These remarks concerning the legal status of PMSC personnel hired by the U.N. for
peacekeeping operations has important practical corollaries. The Security Council
authorizes peacekeepers, and thus PMSCs employed in peacekeeping, to use force either
to defend themselves or to defend the mandate. In both of these situations, personnel of
PMSCs would be regarded as combatants under peacekeeping rules. The use of force in
other situations would affect their legal status. It was reported, for example, that DSL, a
U.K.-based PMSC, used deadly force during its operation to support the U.N. Mission in
Angola, and that DynCorp did the same in East Timor.130 Where PMSC conduct is
illegal, it is debatable whether the same rules of peacekeeping will apply. The legality of
the use of force by PMSCs used in peacekeeping operation, after all, is the reason for
classifying them as combatants rather than as civilians. By this same logic, however, the
use of force not authorized by the Security Council should not entitle them to be regarded
as lawful combatants. They would instead be civilians participating in hostilities, and
under international humanitarian law such civilians may face a variety of legal
consequences ranging from prosecution to loss of protection and categorization as
legitimate military targets.
¶53
A further observation is necessary with regard to according the privileges and
immunities of U.N. personnel to PMSC peacekeepers. The use of a PMSC in U.N.
peacekeeping affords its employees the privileges and immunities of the agents and
personnel of the U.N.131 This can lead to a tension between the Secretary-General’s
Bulletin and the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated
Personnel.132 Employees of PMSCs would be classified as combatants according to the
Secretary-General’s Bulletin, which acknowledges that U.N. forces actively engaged in
armed conflict are combatants.133 At the same time, Article 9 of the Convention on the
Safety of United Nations and Associate Personnel makes it a crime to attack U.N.
personnel and obliges Member States to exercise jurisdictions over such crimes.134 This
contrasts with principles of international humanitarian law, under which attacks
committed by combatants against other combatants are not crimes.135
¶54
Crucially, while peacekeepers are immune from prosecution in the courts of the
host state, this immunity is offset by requirement that the State sending peacekeepers
itself “exercise jurisdiction with respect to crimes or offences which may be committed
by its military personnel serving with [the United Nations peace-keeping operation].”136
The Model Status of Force Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations (SOFA) provides
that the States contributing to the peacekeeping mission must prosecute members of their
militaries for crimes committed in the territory of the host State.137
¶55
In the case of a PMSC hired directly by the U.N., however, it is not easy to provide
for the same sort of jurisdiction. The state where the PMSC is registered may not have
jurisdiction over its employees: such companies recruit individuals from various
130
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nationalities. For example, U.S.-based Blackwater employed 150 Chileans to work in
Iraq.138 At the same time, the U.N. cannot exercise jurisdiction over such crimes, since it
does not have the same criminal justice system as other states. This jurisdictional
challenge might be overcome by amending SOFA to cover this kind of situation. Such an
amendment should either not extend the immunity granted to peacekeepers to PMSC
personnel, in which case the receiving state would have jurisdiction over them, or confer
that jurisdiction on the home state of the company or the state of which the perpetrator is
a national.
¶56
The tension between international humanitarian law and the rules specific to
peacekeeping therefore has a greater significance when dealing with PMSCs employed
directly by the U.N. than when concerning traditional peacekeeping forces. The right to
engage in hostilities without becoming a legitimate military target in turn and immunity
from local prosecution enjoyed by peacekeepers — a constellation of privileges unknown
to international humanitarian law — is counterbalanced by a seconding state’s obligation
to hold its peacekeeping forces to account. Yet PMSCs hired by the U.N. would enjoy
privileges unknown to international humanitarian law without any such counterbalancing
obligations. And in that case, one might wonder why the rules specific to peacekeeping
should trump international humanitarian law.

IV. CONCLUSION
¶57

The legal status of the personnel of PMSCs used in U.N. peacekeeping operations
under peacekeeping rules differs from their status under international humanitarian law.
Under the latter, they are regarded as civilians, forbidden from taking part in hostilities
lest they lose their protected status and face prosecution. However, their status would be
completely different if they were used in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Initially, they
would be considered civilians if they abstained from direct participation in hostilities. If
they engaged actively in armed conflict, however, their protected status as civilians
would be suspended for the time being and they would be regarded as combatants.
¶58
While many international documents have decided in favor of applying
international humanitarian law to U.N. peacekeeping forces, it seems that the entire body
of that law is not readily applied in the peacekeeping context. This would mean that the
definitions of combatant and civilian under international humanitarian law would not be
applicable to PMSCs used in peacekeeping. However, the specific rules applicable to
peacekeepers — such as rules governing the means and methods of warfare — seem to
represent the reaction of the U.N. to violations committed by these personnel. In this
regard, the personnel of PMSCs used in peacekeeping may have two statuses. They are
civilians if they are not involved directly in armed conflict and combatants if they are.
However, they may be regarded as unlawful combatants if they use illegal force. This
conclusion follows from a consideration of international humanitarian law regarding
civilians, rather than the rules specific to peacekeepers. In this regard, the relationship
between international humanitarian law and the rules specific to peacekeeping is one of
U.N.H.R.C., ‘Report of the Working Group on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination' Mission
to Chile’ ¶16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/7/Add.4 (Feb. 4, 2008).
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compromise. This may mean that both laws can apply depending on the circumstances of
the case or situation.
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